



































































Accepted author’s manuscript. Published in final edited form as: Lancet 2020; 395(1228): 
986-997. Publisher DOI: 10.1016/S0140-6736(19)33178-2 
 
 




Generating comparative evidence on new drugs and devices before approval 
 
 
Huseyin Naci, PhD1 
Maximilian Salcher-Konrad, MSc1 
Professor Aaron S. Kesselheim, MD2 
Beate Wieseler, Dr. rer. nat.3 
Professor Lise Rochaix, PhD4 
Professor Rita F. Redberg, MD5 
Georgia Salanti, PhD6 
Professor Emily Jackson, OBE7 
Professor Sarah Garner, PhD8 
Professor T. Scott Stroup, MD  
Professor Andrea Cipriani, PhD10 
 
 
1. Department of Health Policy, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, 
UK 
2. Program On Regulation, Therapeutics, And Law (PORTAL), Division of 
Pharmacoepidemiology and Pharmacoeconomics, Department of Medicine, Brigham and 
Women’s Hospital, Harvard Medical School, Boston, MA, USA 
3. Institute for Quality and Efficiency in Health Care (IQWiG), Cologne, Germany  
4. Hospinnomics, Paris School of Economics, Paris, France 
5. School of Medicine, University of California at San Francisco, San Francisco, CA, USA 
6. Institute of Social and Preventive Medicine, University of Bern, Bern, Switzerland 
7. Department of Law, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK 
8. School of Health Sciences, University of Manchester, Manchester, UK 
9. Department of Psychiatry, Columbia University College of Physicians and Surgeons, New 
York, NY, USA 
10. Department of Psychiatry, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK; Oxford Health NHS 




Dr Huseyin Naci 
Department of Health Policy 
London School of Economics and Political Science  
London WC2A 2AE 
UK  







Fewer than half of new drugs have data on their comparative benefits and harms against existing 
treatment options at the time of regulatory approval in Europe and the US. Even when active-
comparator trials exist, they may not produce meaningful data to inform decisions in clinical 
practice and health policy. Recently, the uncertainty associated with the paucity of well-designed 
active-comparator trials has been compounded by legal and regulatory changes in Europe and 
the US that have created a complex mix of expedited programs aimed at facilitating faster access 
to new drugs. Comparative evidence generation is even sparser for medical devices. Some have 
argued that the current process for regulatory approval needs to generate more evidence that is 
useful for patients, clinicians, and payers in health care systems. We propose a set of 5 key 
principles relevant to the European Medicines Agency (EMA), European medical device 
regulatory agencies, US Food and Drug Administration (FDA), as well as payers, that we believe 
will provide the necessary incentives for pharmaceutical and device companies to generate 
comparative data on drugs and devices and assure timely availability of evidence that is useful for 
decision making. First, labeling should routinely inform patients and clinicians whether 
comparative data exist on new products. Second, regulators should be more selective in their use 
of programs that facilitate drug and device approvals on the basis of incomplete benefit and 
harm data. Third, regulators should encourage the conduct of randomised trials with active 
comparators. Fourth, regulators should use prospectively-designed network meta-analyses based 
on existing and future randomised trials. Fifth, payers should use their policy levers and 
negotiating power to incentivise the generation of comparative evidence on new and existing 
drugs and devices, for example, by explicitly considering proven added benefit in pricing and 







A record-breaking number of new drugs and devices have entered the market in recent 
years. In 2018, the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) granted approval to 59 drugs and 
106 devices (compared to an average of 28 drug approvals per year during the preceding decade), 
and the European Medicines Agency (EMA) approved 42 new drugs. In addition to new drugs 
for established therapeutic areas with large numbers of existing treatment options (e.g., 
antidepressants for depression,1 statins for coronary heart disease,2 and HbA1c-lowering 
therapies for diabetes3), the research and development pipelines of pharmaceutical and device 
companies have in recent decades delivered new therapies for rare diseases.4 For example, 
several new agents are now available for the treatment of multiple myeloma,5 chronic myeloid 
leukemia,6 Gaucher disease,7 and pulmonary arterial hypertension.8  
This is good news for patients, since some of these novel therapies have turned out to be 
beneficial.9 For example, drugs like imatinib for chronic myeloid leukemia and sofosbuvir for 
hepatitis C have transformed clinical outcomes, improving and extending the lives of patients 
suffering from these serious and life-threatening conditions.10,11 However, other new drugs like 
the HbA1c-lowering rosiglitazone have turned out to have differing benefit/risk profiles than 
expected in certain populations and subsequently been removed from some markets.12–14 Also, 
there have been several important safety crises related to high-risk medical devices, resulting in 
their market withdrawal, such as pelvic mesh,15 and metal contraceptive implants.16  
The market entry of larger numbers of new drugs and devices may also paradoxically 
complicate treatment decisions if there are little or no data on the comparative benefits and 
harms of new versus existing alternatives. “What is the treatment of choice for my patient with condition 
x?” is a key question for clinical practice.17 Without data on comparative benefits and harms, it 
may be difficult for patients and clinicians to identify the appropriate therapy.  
In this Series on Comparative Effectiveness Research, we describe and highlight some 
fundamental principles related to developing comparative data on drugs and devices, particularly 
if multiple options exist to treat the same condition. Our primary focus is on the FDA and 
EMA, which serve as gatekeepers to the largest pharmaceutical markets worldwide that 
collectively account for over 60% of total sales. In the US, FDA is also responsible for medical 
device regulation; in the EU, notified bodies designated by national authorities are responsible 
for conformity assessments of devices (Table 1).18 FDA and EMA are tasked with the goals of 
granting expeditious access to promising new treatments while also requiring adequate data 
before approval to protect patients from ineffective and potentially harmful products. Regulatory 
agencies’ evidence standards for approval shape the quantity and quality of clinical studies 






In this first paper of the Series, we examine the availability of comparative effectiveness 
data, and outline how the current regulatory approaches to approving new medicines and devices 
address the evidence needs of patients, clinicians, and other decision makers in health systems. 
Recent policy changes aimed at speeding up the development, review, and approval of new 
products have complicated health system-wide efforts to generate comparative data on drugs and 
devices before and after approval. We therefore propose strategies to improve the future 
availability of comparative data at the time of market entry. The second paper of the Series 
focuses on the generation of comparative evidence in the post-marketing period for drugs and 
devices but also interventions for which often there is no commercial developer and no 
dedicated regulatory system, e.g., surgical interventions. The third paper analyses the ethical 
tensions in comparative effectiveness research.  
 
Availability of comparative evidence on new drugs and devices 
Comparative evidence on newly-approved drugs is limited for a number of reasons. One 
primary reason is that pharmaceutical manufacturers do not routinely collect such data in the 
studies leading to drug approval. In both the US and Europe, the regulatory agencies’ statutory 
mandate is to evaluate a drug’s benefit-risk balance and intended effects, not its comparative 
benefits and harms against existing alternatives. Placebo controls in randomised clinical trials 
(RCTs) can establish ‘assay sensitivity,’ or the ability to distinguish between an effective and 
ineffective treatment.19 Of course, for some truly innovative drugs, active comparators may not 
exist at the time of approval.  
According to earlier estimates (covering regulatory approval decisions through 2010), 
fewer than half of drugs approved in the US and Europe had one or more RCTs with an active 
comparator at the time of approval.20,21 To obtain recent estimates in Europe (covering 
regulatory approval decisions after the EMA’s recommendation for active-comparator trials), we 
reviewed the characteristics of clinical studies that served as the basis for EMA drug approvals 
from 2015 through 2018 (Figure 1). During this period, the annual proportion of new drugs that 
had at least one RCT with an active comparator at the time of approval ranged from 
approximately a quarter to one half.   
Lack of an active comparator can lead to uncertainty regarding the relative benefits and 
harms of treatments at the time of market approval (Panel 1). Although these questions could be 
answered in the post-marketing period, they are not often fully addressed, as we discuss in Paper 






Another reason for lack of comparative data is that choosing an active comparator can 
be difficult. For example, several products may be suitable candidates due to differences in their 
clinical benefit, safety, or cost profiles. One review found that active comparators used in pivotal 
trials leading to regulatory approval do not always represent the best available treatment.22 Also, 
manufacturers can compare their new treatments to sub-optimal comparators (e.g. lower doses 
than recommended or ineffective treatments) rather than the best available option.23  
Comparative evidence generation is even sparser for medical devices. The majority of 
high-risk devices are approved for use without rigorous studies. In the US, even the most 
stringent regulatory pathway for high-risk devices tends to involve a single clinical study that is 
typically non-randomised and with no control group.24,25 Between 2010 and 2011, approximately 
90% of high-risk devices were approved by the FDA on the basis of a single pivotal trial. Less 
than half of studies supporting the FDA approval of high-risk cardiovascular devices between 
2000 and 2011 included active comparators.26 Currently, corresponding figures for European 
device approvals are not available due to lack of transparency.27 However, new European 
medical device regulations, which will come into effect in 2020 will require the public disclosure 
of this information in a new database (expected to be available in 2022).   
 
 
Expedited programs  
Over the past few decades, legislatures and regulators have established several expedited 
development, review, and approval programs for drugs (see Panel 2 for an overview of 
programs in the US and Europe). An expedited program also exists for high-risk medical devices 
in the US, but not in Europe. Although expedited programs differ in their scope and focus, 
which range from putting deadlines on regulatory review times to approving products on the 
basis of earlier-stage data than what is typically required, their shared objective is to provide 
faster access to new products.28  
One rationale for introducing such programs is to meet patient demand for potentially 
effective therapies for life-threatening diseases for which there is no existing treatment.29,30 
Studies have confirmed that drugs that qualify for expedited programs have shorter development 
times and receive regulatory approval faster. Between 2012 and 2016, the duration of clinical 
development was almost one year shorter for drugs in the FDA’s expedited programs than for 
drugs that were not.31  
In the US, more than three-quarters of new drugs are now approved through such 






therapeutic benefit over existing alternatives (for example, lumacaftor for cystic fibrosis), others 
do not.33 For example, cancer drugs that received the FDA’s breakthrough therapy designation 
between 2012 and 2017 did not outperform other cancer drugs approved during the same period 
on trial endpoints.34 In addition, drugs that entered the market via expedited programs have been 
more likely to be the subject of drug safety communications after approval, new boxed warnings, 
and even market withdrawals.35,36  
Although not all expedited programs lower the evidence standards for regulatory 
approval (Panel 2), reviews show that eligible drugs enter the market on the basis of studies with 
smaller sample sizes and shorter follow-up durations that are less likely to be randomised and 
blinded.37, 38–41 Expedited programs have also further reduced the prospect of evidence on the 
comparative benefits and harms of new and existing drugs and devices. Clinical studies that 
support expedited versus regular approvals are also more likely to lack comparator treatments.42 
For example, “single-group” studies, which test an experimental treatment on its own (without a 
concurrent control group), are commonly used for evaluating drugs targeting rare conditions and 
those that are the subject of expedited development or review.43 The rate of successful “single-
group” study submissions to regulatory agencies more than doubled over the past decade.44 
Between 1995 and 2017, the proportion of FDA approvals with “single-group” studies increased 
only for drugs in expedited programs, and not for those that did not benefit from such 
programs.45  
Also, studies supporting the approvals of drugs in expedited programs are more likely to 
collect data on surrogate measures of benefit – biomarkers, laboratory values, or other physical 
measures – rather than patient-oriented clinically-relevant outcomes, such as improved 
functioning or longer survival.37 While surrogate measures reduce the duration, size, and cost of 
clinical studies, thereby facilitating faster patient access to promising new treatments,46,47 they 
further magnify the uncertainty associated with the lack of active comparators (see Panel 1). Use 
of surrogates is only helpful if the treatments are ultimately proven to be effective.48 Some 
surrogate measures such as systolic blood pressure in cardiovascular disease and viral load in 
HIV/AIDS may correlate with long-term clinical outcomes.48,49 However, many surrogate 
measures used in regulatory approvals are not validated predictors of clinical outcomes.50 At the 
time of approval, it remains unknown whether short-term findings will materialise into long-term 
improvements in morbidity or mortality.51,52  
 






When new drugs and devices lack active comparators at the time of approval, it has 
several important implications for stakeholders in health systems, including health technology 
assessment organisations, payers, clinicians and patients. Several European health technology 
assessment organisations like the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) in 
England, Haute Autorité de Santé (HAS) in France, and the Institute for Quality and Efficiency 
in Health Care (IQWiG) in Germany explicitly require comparative data for their 
assessments.53,54 Assessments conducted by these organisations serve as the basis of subsequent 
pricing and payment decisions. Private and public insurers in the US could also benefit from 
such evidence for their pricing and formulary coverage negotiations with pharmaceutical and 
device manufacturers.55 
The evidence generated at the time of regulatory approval has spillover effects on data 
availability for health technology assessment organisations and payers.56 The time interval 
between approval and payment decisions is short and declining (similar to regulators, health 
technology assessment organisations are under pressure to expedite their reviews);57 therefore, 
regulatory agencies, health technology assessment organisations, and payers often assess near-
identical clinical data, albeit to address different objectives. In the absence of comparative data at 
the time of drug and device approval, many health technology assessment organisations and 
payers resort to using data with varying levels of limitations and uncertainty.58  
Current evidence standards may give patients and clinicians false reason for optimism 
that new treatments are beneficial and safe.59,60 Clinicians and patients often overestimate the 
quality and quantity of evidence supporting new treatments.61–64 Media reporting on new drugs 
may contribute to patients’ overly optimistic expectations about drug benefits.65 For example, 
news reports on cancer drugs rarely discuss treatment failure and adverse events.66 Complicating 
matters further is the regulatory agencies’ increasing use of terms like “breakthrough therapies” 
in the US and “priority medicines” in Europe to refer to products in expedited programs.67 In a 
randomised survey study among US adults, labeling a drug as a “breakthrough” altered people’s 
planned behaviour and increased their positive perceptions in the drug’s effectiveness.68  
 
Importance of generating comparative evidence before market entry 
Comparative data on new drugs and devices usually does not emerge after regulatory 
approval. When drugs and devices are originally approved for particular indications without 
randomised, active-comparator trials, such data are unlikely to emerge in the post-marketing 
period.69 Even when post-marketing studies are required by the FDA and EMA, they can remain 
incomplete years after approval.70–74 Just about half of drugs with FDA accelerated approvals 






market.75 Fewer than 15% of initiated post-market studies for high-risk medical devices in the 
US were completed five years after approval.25 Even when post-marketing studies are completed, 
the design characteristics of studies conducted after approval closely resemble those of pre-
approval studies (e.g., use of surrogate measures, lack of comparators).76,77 For example, 42% of 
post-marketing studies requested by the EMA for conditional approvals from 2006 to 2016 were 
non-randomised, and 73% were not blinded.78 
Figure 3 illustrates the lack of comparative data after market entry in selected 
therapeutic areas. In rheumatoid arthritis, for example, the evidence base for biologic agents is 
comprised predominantly of placebo-controlled trials. Despite significant research investment in 
this area over the past 30 years, culminating in 200 placebo-controlled trials and over 100 meta-
analyses,79 rich randomised, comparative evidence on different available biologic agents for this 
condition is still lacking.  
 
Prioritising the generation of comparative data before approval  
The evidence requirements for market authorisation of new treatments have important 
implications for the research conducted on new drugs and devices. Routine regulatory approval 
of drugs and high-risk devices on the basis of placebo-controlled or “single-group” studies may 
disincentivise manufacturers from investing in more clinically useful active-comparator trials. 
Manufacturers may also interpret regulatory flexibility in data requirements in certain areas as a 
shorter and cheaper route to market and shift their research priorities accordingly. Evidence 
from clinical trials in cancer suggests that manufacturers’ recent research investments have been 
shifted away from long-term projects.80  
Continuing the recent trajectory of approving most new drugs and high-risk devices on 
the basis of limited and weak data may further fragment the evidence base with adverse health 
and economic consequences. Ineffective treatments may remain on the market for long periods 
of time, at substantial cost, exposing patients to treatments without reliable evidence of benefit.81 
From an economic perspective, if health systems pay for expensive products when cheaper 
alternatives may work just as well, fewer resources are available for services and treatments 
proven to be cost-effective.82  
We therefore recommend five strategies, which we believe will promote and facilitate the 
generation of comparative data (Table 2).  
 
1. Greater transparency on comparative data availability  
Product labelling (also known as the package insert in the US and the summary of 






about newly-approved drugs to clinicians and patients. In the US and Europe, product labelling 
guides clinicians and patients on safe and effective use of new therapies.  
Currently, product labelling does not include statements about what is or is not known 
about the relative benefits and harms of new and existing drugs. For devices, the recently 
published European guidance on the Summary of Safety and Clinical Performance, which will 
accompany high-risk medical device approvals, will require manufacturers to summarise 
“possible diagnostic or therapeutic alternatives.”83 No such explicit requirement exists for high-
risk devices approved by the FDA.  
Without this information, patients and clinicians remain largely unaware that most new 
treatments are not tested against other alternatives. According to a national survey in the US, 
almost three-quarters of clinicians believed that FDA approval is based on at least comparable 
effectiveness of a new product to other approved alternatives.63 Several RCTs confirmed that 
improving the content of product labeling can result in a better understanding of available data 
on benefits and harms, thereby improving decision making and subsequent treatment choices.84–
86  
We recommend that product labelling report in non-technical language whether head-to-
head studies have been conducted at the time of approval (e.g., “this drug/device has not been 
tested against other drugs/devices indicated for the same condition”).87,88  
 
2. More selective use of expedited programs 
Flexibility in regulatory standards enabled by expedited programs is warranted in cases 
when there is significant unmet need. Although some of the most transformative drugs benefited 
from these programs, qualification for expedited programs has expanded in recent years.32,45 In 
the US, an increasing share of products have benefited from multiple expedited programs 
simultaneously. The FDA recently introduced an expedited program also for medical devices; no 
such program exists in Europe.89  
There are questions about when in the preclinical testing process drug manufacturers 
may qualify for such programs. According to senior FDA officials, consideration of the 
accelerated approval pathway during the first decade of the program often arose only when the 
manufacturers submitted their applications to the FDA, not before.81 Although the conditional 
marketing authorisation pathway in Europe has been less frequently used than similar programs 
in the US, recent reviews showed that the EMA used this pathway to grant approval in some 






We recommend that expedited programs be reserved for a clearly demarcated, 
prospectively defined set of circumstances in both Europe and the US. Regulators in both 
settings should work collaboratively with patient groups and the industry to develop new 
guidelines to determine the eligibility of drugs for inclusion in such programs. In addition to 
factors such as availability of alternative treatment options, disease severity, and prevalence, 
manufacturers should be required to present well-designed and credible evidence-generation 
plans to ensure timely completion of additional studies in the post-marketing period.92 These 
post-marketing studies should be underway with clear milestones at the time of approval as a 
condition for inclusion in expedited programs.  
When expedited programs are used, regulators should publicly report the qualifying 
reasons. Regulators should also strengthen their oversight of post-marketing evidence 
commitments and requirements.93,94 Although both the FDA and EMA have statutory authority 
to enforce timely completion of post-marketing studies, including imposing civil monetary 
penalties (FDA) and rescinding approval (FDA for accelerated approval drugs and EMA for 
conditional marketing authorisation drugs), they tend not to invoke such power,95 citing resource 
constraints.96,97  
 
3. More routine use of active comparator RCTs 
RCTs have been the mainstay of phased drug development since the 1960s.98 Over the 
past half century, the vast majority of therapeutic agents have been approved on the basis of 
RCTs, albeit predominantly with placebo controls. RCTs are also essential to determining the 
effectiveness of moderate- and high-risk devices. In recent years, however, the role of RCTs in 
drug and device development has been increasingly contested due to their high complexity and 
cost.99 Other common criticisms of RCTs include the poor generalisability of their findings due 
to inclusion of selective participant populations that do not adequately represent populations in 
actual clinical practice.100 Also, RCTs are rarely large enough to detect reliably uncommon harms.  
A particular source of controversy related to RCTs is whether they are applicable to rare 
disease treatments. While RCTs might be more challenging to conduct in rare disease settings, 
evidence from FDA approvals in the US confirms their feasibility. In one study, incidence of 
disease was not associated with the likelihood that evidence from a RCT was available at the time 
of approval.101 In addition, over a third of trials in very rare diseases with a prevalence of <1 per 
million were randomised.102 Over half of “single-group” studies in a recent review of cancer drug 






RCTs with active comparators should be more routinely used for drug and device 
approval.104 Strategies aimed at improving trial efficiency may help offset the additional costs of 
including active comparator arms in RCTs. Trial efficiency could be improved by simplifying 
participant recruitment and data collection through clinical registries. RCTs embedded in 
registries have recently been touted as “the next disruptive technology in clinical research.”105 
Regulators should routinely investigate the availability, validity, and completeness of outcome 
data in existing clinical registries to facilitate embedding active-comparator trials. Moreover, 
manufacturers can substantially reduce trial complexity by imposing fewer restrictions on 
participant selection, thereby also improving the external validity of outcomes.106   
 
4. Prospectively designed network meta-analyses 
Network meta-analysis is a statistical method to assess the relative benefits and harms of 
multiple treatments that are not compared directly.107–109 Currently, network meta-analyses are 
often based on a retrospective collection of RCTs conducted by different researchers at different 
times including different patient populations.110 Such analyses may be at risk of bias due to the 
relative availability of documents that describe trial conduct and analysis, potential reporting 
biases, and differences in the characteristics of patient populations or standards of care (some of 
which may be unknown or unmeasured).109,111 These limitations may jeopardise the validity of 
network meta-analyses and their usefulness for decision making. Of the 71 network meta-
analyses submitted to IQWiG from 2011 to 2016, only 11 (15%) were deemed valid.112  
We recommend prospectively designing network meta-analyses to address these 
limitations and produce comparative evidence on new treatments at the time of market entry.113 
A prospectively designed network meta-analysis would rely on a pre-determined set of RCTs 
with broadly similar design features (patient population characteristics, follow-up durations, core 
outcome sets) so that their findings can be synthesised upon completion. Prospectively designed 
network meta-analyses would generate comparative data earlier and more efficiently than 
alternative methods.114,115 Regulatory agencies would be uniquely positioned to conduct such 
analyses, as individual participant data that can be made available to regulators would improve 
the validity of network meta-analyses. Routinely conducting pre-planned network meta-analyses 
will require the development of appropriate expertise within the regulatory agencies. 
As there is no centralised regulatory agency for medical devices in Europe, greater 
collaboration among national competent authorities would be needed when performing network 
meta-analyses of medical devices. Still, individual participant data may not be routinely available 






Prospectively designing network meta-analyses would require regulatory scientific advice 
on the design of RCTs of products seeking the same (or similar) indications. As the validity of 
network meta-analyses depend on the quality of relevant RCTs, efforts are needed to improve 
the design features of RCTs used for regulatory decisions. Although intensive regulatory 
scientific advice is already an integral part of drug and device development in the US, and drug 
development in Europe,116,117 it is typically centred around the clinical studies of one product at a 
time. What is instead needed is a more holistic approach that considers each RCT as part of an 
evolving research landscape in a therapeutic area. When giving advice to manufacturers about 
study designs, regulators should consider the RCTs of different products as components of 
future network meta-analyses. Regulators should encourage manufacturers to design trials that 
are similar enough to be synthesized but with a degree of variability that gives information about 
differences across populations and settings. Making regulatory scientific advice publicly available 
would support the design and conduct of sufficiently similar studies in a given therapeutic area. 
Such analyses can first be pilot-tested by multi-stakeholder initiatives involving regulators. 
 
5. Considering comparative effectiveness evidence in pricing and payment decisions 
Health technology assessment reviews conducted on the basis of available evidence have 
found that the majority of new product approvals offer no proven added therapeutic benefit 
compared to existing alternatives.118 Yet, there is currently no direct association between the 
manufacturer-set launch prices of new drugs and devices and the comparative benefits they 
offer.119,120 In some cases, manufacturers have even sought to charge more for their less-effective 
products.121  
When making pricing and payment decisions, payers in different countries consider a 
complex mix of factors beyond clinical data on benefits and harms, including the availability of 
alternative treatments, rarity of disease, cost-effectiveness, budget impact, and perceived novelty 
of the treatment. Such scientific and social value judgements serve as guiding principles in what 
are inherently complex, multi-faceted decisions.122 We recommend making comparative 
effectiveness evidence an explicit criterion in future pricing and payment decisions. Payers’ 
negotiating power could incentivise the generation of comparative evidence on new and existing 
drugs and devices. Such developments are already underway in Germany and France, and their 
experiences can be instructive for other countries.123  
What would pricing and payment arrangements look like if guided by explicit 
comparative effectiveness principles? Companies that demonstrate the superiority of their 






comparator RCTs should command higher prices or payment levels. Standards of care may 
differ across settings and change over time, which may complicate formally incorporating 
comparative effectiveness evidence into decision making. Conversely, drugs and devices that do 
not demonstrate added benefit should be priced and paid at a lower level than other treatments 
on offer. If only tentative evidence is available (from weak study designs or on the basis of 
surrogate measures), manufacturers should be required to give price concessions to payers until 
meaningful comparative data emerges from ongoing studies.  
 
Conclusions 
Comparative data on the benefits and harms of new and existing drugs that are essential 
to make evidence-based decisions in clinical practice and health policy are hard to come by. The 
broad use of expedited programs in both the US and Europe has compounded the already-
substantial shortcomings of the available evidence on new drugs at the time of market entry, 
further complicating efforts to determine how new drugs fare against existing alternatives. 
Comparative evidence generation is even sparser for medical devices. Policymakers and 
regulators can facilitate timely generation of comparative data on drugs and devices by 
promoting greater transparency, using expedited programs in a more clearly demarcated set of 
circumstances, encouraging the use of RCTs with active comparators, prospectively designing 
network meta-analyses, and linking the prices or payment levels of new products to their 
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Table 1. Medical device regulation in the European Union and the United States.  
 
 European Union United States 
Regulatory agency • There is no centralised agency responsible for regulating 
medical devices in Europe.  
• For medical devices, private and for-profit “notified bodies” 
designated by national competent authorities are responsible 
for conducting conformity assessments.  
• A medical device can be marketed in the European Union 
either after self-certification by the manufacturer for some 
low-risk devices (class 1) or after receiving the certificate of 
conformity by a notified body. The Conformité Européenne 
(CE) marking is affixed by the manufacturer to confirm that it 
has a certificate. 
• EMA’s regulatory role is primarily limited to medicinal 
products that include a medical device (combination products, 
medical devices with an ancillary medicinal substance, 
companion diagnostics used to identify suitable patients for 
treatment, and medical devices made of substances that are 
systematically absorbed). 
• FDA is responsible for regulating medical devices in the US. 
• A medical device can only be marketed in the US after 
receiving FDA approval.  
Evidence standards for 
approval 
• Generally, high-risk and implantable devices must undergo a 
clinical investigation.  
• Design features of clinical investigations are not specified. 
• Evidence standards may vary across different notified bodies. 
• Moderate-risk devices and some high-risk devices can be 
“cleared” through the 510(k) pathway, which typically does 
not require clinical data. 
• High-risk devices are approved through the pre-market 
approval (PMA) pathway, which requires clinical trials 
evaluating the effectiveness and safety of devices.  
Availability of expedited 
programs  
No • FDA’s Breakthrough devices program offers intensive 
interaction and priority review to expedite the development 
and review for “devices that provide more effective treatment 
or diagnosis of life-threatening or irreversibly debilitating 
human disease or conditions.” 
Risk categorisation • Class I: low-risk (e.g., wheelchairs) 
• Class II: moderate-risk (e.g., tracheotomy tubes) 
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Panel 2. Overview of current expedited development and regulatory review programs for drugs 
and devices  
 
• FDA Priority review designation: guarantees “shorter clock for review of marketing 
application (6 months compared with the 10-month standard review) for drugs that treat a 
serious condition and have the potential to provide a significant improvement in safety or 
effectiveness.” 1 
• FDA Fast-track designation: provides “actions to expedite development and review, 
including rolling review, for drugs intended to treat a serious condition or address unmet 
medical need.” 1 
• FDA Accelerated approval pathway: offers “approval based on an effect on a surrogate 
endpoint or an intermediate clinical endpoint that is reasonably likely to predict clinical benefit 
for drugs that treat a serious condition and provide a meaningful advantage over available 
therapies.” 1 
• FDA Breakthrough therapy designation: provides “intensive guidance on efficient drug 
development, organisational commitment, rolling review, and other actions to expedite review 
for drugs intended to treat a serious condition or have the potential to demonstrate substantial 
improvement on a clinically significant endpoint over available therapies.” 1 
• EMA Approval under exceptional circumstances: “granted to medicines where the 
applicant is unable to provide comprehensive data on the efficacy and safety under normal 
conditions of use, because the condition to be treated is rare or because collection of full 
information is not possible or is unethical.” 2 
• EMA Conditional marketing authorisation: “grants approval on the basis of less 
comprehensive data than normally required for drugs that address unmet medical needs of 
patients.” 3 
• EMA Accelerated assessment: guarantees “rapid assessment (150 days vs 210) for 
medicines that are of major interest for public health, especially ones that are therapeutic 
innovations.” 4 
• EMA Priority medicines (PRIME) scheme: offers “enhanced early dialogue with 
manufacturers to optimise development plans and accelerated assessment of medicines that 






















Data extracted from publicly available European Public Assessment Reports of new active substances with 



















Source: Authors  
Data extracted from the publicly available Drugs@FDA database of new molecular entity approvals by the 














Figure 3. Lack of comparative evidence in selected therapeutic areas. Each node represents a 
different active treatment and the lines connecting the nodes represent direct head-to-head 
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Table 2. Strategies aimed at incentivising pharmaceutical and device manufacturers to generate comparative data on drugs and devices. 
Overall strategies Key recommendations Target stakeholders 
(1) Greater transparency on 
comparative data availability at the 
time of market entry 
 
• Product labels should routinely report whether head-to-head 
comparisons of new and existing treatment options are 
available at the time of market entry. 




• Device manufacturers 




• Expedited programs should be reserved for a clearly 
demarcated set of circumstances. 
• New guidelines should be developed to determine the 
eligibility of drugs and devices for inclusion in expedited 
programs in the US and eligibility of drugs in Europe.  
• Reasons for eligibility should be routinely and openly 
reported. 
• Regulatory agencies (FDA 
and EMA) with input from 
public payers in the US 
(Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid) and national health 
technology assessment 
organisations in Europe 
(3) More routine use of randomised, 
active comparator trials 
 
• New products should be evaluated in randomised controlled 
trials with active comparators. 
• Trial efficiency should be improved by loosening trial 
eligibility criteria and by appraising the suitability of registry-
based trials.  
• Regulators (FDA and EMA) 
• Pharmaceutical 
manufacturers 
• Device manufacturers 
• National governments 
(4) Prospectively designed network 
meta-analyses 
 
• Network meta-analyses should be prospectively designed 
within each therapeutic area. 
• Pre-approval scientific advice should harmonise trial designs, 
populations, interventions, comparators, core outcome sets, 
and follow-up durations to ensure broad similarity across 
different trials. 
• Regulators (FDA and EMA) 
• Pharmaceutical 
manufacturers 
• Device manufacturers 
• European national 
competent authorities 
(5) Considering comparative 
effectiveness evidence in pricing and 
payment decisions 
 
• Comparative effectiveness data should be a central tenet of 
pricing and payment decisions. 
• Only products with demonstrated superiority should warrant 
higher prices compared to alternatives.  
• Public payers in the US and 
Europe 
• Health technology 
assessment organisations 
 
